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The impact on local government finances of the reservation of land for national
parks in local government areas has been a bone of contention. This article
identifies conditions in which the reservation of land for national parks increases
total rateable unimproved property values in a local government area. The level
of a local government's receipts from rates tends to move in the same direction
as the total value of rateable property in its local government area. Thus, even
though national parks and similar natural areas are not rateable. it is possible that
the reservation of some local government areas for such protection can increase
revenue from rates. However this is not always so and conditions for an increase
in local government revenue are specified. Local governments may wish to
maximise their income for discretionary expenditures rather than total receipts.
Conditions are specified in which the reservation of local areas for national parks
fosters - and conflicts with - this objective. Depending upon the nature of the
relevant functions, local government finances may benefit from the existence of
national parks in a local government area or be adversely affected by their
presence. As far as we are aware, the conditions for this have not been previously
specified.
1. INTRODUCTION
There has been considerable controversy in Australia about whether the presence
of national parks (or similar natural areas) in a local government area creates an
economic burden for local government (e.g. LGAQ, 2000; Ryan and Schwartz,
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2000). Some local governments hold the view that the creation of national parks (or
similar protected areas such as some state forests) lowers their rateable property-
base and hence their total revenue from rates levied on the unimproved value of
property. In addition, many councils believe that costs of council operations do not
fall commensurably with loss of tax revenue in such cases. National parks in
Australia do not pay council rates.
In contrast, the presence of natioJ;lal parks or similar areas may increase the
unimproved value of land, the main tax base for local government in Queensland.
For example, Pearson et al. (200 I) report that properties in Noosa (on the Sunshine
Coast of Queensland) that have a view of Noosa National Park (headland section)
have a higher unimproved value than those which do not, all other variables being
equal. It may also be true generally that the presence of Noosa National Park keeps
property values higher throughout the Noosa local government area than would be
so in its absence.
While the unimproved value ofland is difficult to estimate, it is generally based
on the market value of sales ofcomparable land, exclusive of the value of buildings
and other improvements on this land. In Queensland, unimproved land valuations
are determined by the state Department of Natural Resources and are reviewed
annually in accordance with the Queensland Valuation of Land Act (1944), as
amended. Such valuations only apply to freehold land.
In the case where improvements exist on the land involved, the Queensland
Valuation of Land Act (1944) defines the unimproved value of the land as "the
capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered
for sale on such reasonable teITIlS and conditions as a bonafide seller would require
assuming that at the time at which the value is required to be ascertained for the
purpose of this Act, the improvement did not exist". This is further clarified in the
Queensland Land Court decision in the case of the State Insurance Office
(Queensland) vs. Valuer General (1981 7 QLCR at 180) in which it is stated that
the unimproved value relates to land "notionally stripped of its improvements and
viewed in its natural state but in the environment (with all its inherent advantages,
facilities and services, etc.) in which the subject land is actually situated at the
relevant date of the valuation", Thus improvement in the surrounding environment
may increase the unimproved value of land, and such improvement will normally
be reflected in the market price for the land. The law affecting the valuation ofland
in Australia as a whole is outlined in Hyam (1995); further discussion can be found
in Trimboli (1979) and Meeking and Blackwell (1997).
Although reserving some land for a national park can raise remaining property
values in a local area, which is probably the case at Noosa, this is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for increasing the rateable property-base in a local
government area. This is now examined from a theoretical perspective. As a
starting point, the rateable property-base available to a council is considered as a
function of the land area reserved for national parks within the council's area. It is
assumed that the larga is the rateable property-base the higher is the total amount
of rates available to a council. The analysis will subsequently be extended to take
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account of the expenditure side of a council's budget and the net budgetary impact
of withdrawing rateable land to reserve it for national parks.
2. IMPACT OF NATIONAL PARK RESERVATION ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TOTAL RATEABLE PROPERTY VALUES AND
TOTAL LEVEL OF RATES
Take any particular local government area and assume that its land area is K, that
X represents the areaofland subject to council rates and K-X is the amount ofland
allocated to national parks or similar uses and not rateable. The land area K - X is
not rateable. The total unimproved value of rateable properties. V. in the local area
can then be specified by
v = fiX) where x,,; K and V = 0 for X = 0 (I)
Of relevance for considering the impact on total unimproved rateable property
value of national parks is the nature of dVldX, the marginal impact on unimproved
rateable land value as a result of increasing the quantity of rateable land, thereby
reducing the quantity of land reserved for national parks. The expression. dVldX,
represents the marginal change in the total unimproved value with respect to area
of rateable land. VI X represents the average unimproved value ofland per unit area
of rateable land.
It will also be supposed that the total level of rates collected by a council, R, is
a positive function of the total unimproved value of its rateable property, V, that is
R =g(V) where g'> 0 (2)
In these circumstances whether or not a council would benefit in tenns of its
total rates depends upon the allocation of land in its local government area to
national parks, and whether
V' =r (X)=O for a value of X < K (3)
or V'=j'(X)? 0 for X = K (4)
If expression (3) holds, an interior mathematical solution occurs and the
council can maximise its rateable property values by ensuring that a suitable
quantity of land is reserved for national parks or natural areas. If equation (3) is
satisfied for X = Xl. rateable property values are maximised when the area allocated
to national parks or similar natural areas is K :::;: Xl. Ifequation (4) applies, a corner-
point mathematical solution occurs. implying that none of the local area should be
allocated to national parks or similar natural areas if the council wants to maximise
its rateable property-base and its receipts from rates.
The two cases - an interior solution and a comer-point solution - are illustrated
in Figure 1. Two cases are illustrated there, namely an interior solution and a corner-
point one. In the fonner case, average rateable value ofland is shown to rise at first
as more land is reserved for national parks. then fall as indicated by curve aCE for
average rateable property values, VIX. The corresponding marginal curve for total
rateable property value V', is as indicated by curve ABCD. This latter curve equals
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FIGURE 1
LAND ALLOCATIONS REQffiRED FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO
MAXIMISE TOTAL RATEARLE UNIMPROVED PROPERTY VALUE
Marginal value for comer-point case
$ \ J
H G
Marginal
and average
vallue of
rateable land
T
¥ Marginal value E
A
0
Xo K X
D
Area of rateable land
--
-
Area allocated to national parks
zero when Xl ofthe local area is available as rateable property and K - Xzis reserved
for national parks.
Such a combination of non-rateable and rateable land (involving K - X, of the
local area allocated to national parks andX,subject to rates) maxintises total rateable
property values because dVldX = 0 ensures that the second order condition for a
maximum is satisfied. namely V'" < O. Also. the total amount of revenue available to
the council from land rates is at a maximum because R :;;: g(V) and g'> 0, as set out
in expression (2). In other words, the revenue ofcouncil from rates is assumed to rise
with an increase in the value of rateable property values in its local government area.
To illustrate the comer-point case, property values per unit of property are
assumed (in Figure I) to fall as indicated by curve OFG (in Figure I) as a greater
area of the local government area is allocated to national parks. In this case, the
marginal value curve, THJ is above the average value curve and is of positive value
throughout. Thus, if any of the local government area is allocated to national parks,
the total value of the rateable property-base of the local council declines.
Consequently, the total value of rates collected by the council falls. In ,ueh cases,
councils may have a negative attitude to the presence of national parks in their
local region.
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Little is known empirically about the shape and positions of the type of
functions depicted in Figure 1. However, the relevant functions are likely to vary
between local areas. They may also be flat over some ranges. Empirical evidence
is needed to throw more light on this matter.
Note also that inverted U-shaped functions do not necessarily imply that an
interior solution is optimal. In some cases, it is possible for V"to be positive for all
values at X < K and to be positive or zero at X ::;; K. Furthennore, as can be seen
from Figure 1. maximising the value of rateable property per unit area does not
maximise total rateable property value. In the inverted U-shaped case, the former
result occurs for Xo(that is for K-Xoreserved for national parks) whereas the latter
occurs for X, which implies less land reserved for national parks. It is possible that
individual landholders might prefer the former situation but the council may prefer
the latter. So some conflict between interest groups can arise.
3. NET BUDGET CONSEQUENCES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF
RESERVAnON OF LAND FOR PROTECTED AREAS
Ultimately. local government bodies are more likely to be interested in the net
impact on their budgets of the allocation of local land to national parks rather than
its impact solely on their receipts. Infrastructure within national parks is usually
provided and maintained by the relevant state parks and wildlife service
organizations. In Queensland, this is the Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service,
now a part of the Environmental Protection Agency. Thus local councils are likely
to escape some of the costs associated with land allocated to national parks
compared to a situation in which this land is rateable property. Nevertheless,local
councils are usually responsible for public roads which intersect national parks and
for general access roads to the perimeters of national parks. and often for parking
areas just outside national park boundaries.
Suppose that local council outlays can be divided into (a) obligatory outlays for
infrastructure and (b) discretionary outlays. Furthermore, suppose that obligatory
outlays are a function of the total area of its rateable property and can be indicated
by the function, C(X). The aim of the council is assumed to be to maximise its
discretionary income, Y.
This can be expressed as a desire to maximise
Y = g(V) - C(X)
= g[V(X)J- e(X)
where g' > O. This can be simplified to
Y = heX) - e(x)
and will be at a maximum when
Y'=h'(X)-C'(X) =0
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
and the relevant second order condition is met. This is assuming an interior solution
occurs.
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In the interior case, the optimal area of rateable land for maximising the
discretionary income of council is that for which marginal value of rates obtained
by council equals the marginal cost of obligatory council servicing of this land.
Given that the marginal costs of council servicing of land can be expected to be
positive for all possible values of X, this implies that the council may maximise its
discretionary income by having a larger proportion of its land allocated to national
parks than if council was only concerned to maximise its total receipts from rates.
A series of diagrams can be used to illustrate several pertinent points.
First, when rateable property values and rates would be maximised by allocating
some of the local area to national parks, avoidance of some obligatory marginal
servicing costs by council as a result of altered land status from rateable to national
park will tend to increase the optimal proportion of the local area to allocate to
national parks.
This is illustrated in Figure 2. The curve ABeD represents the marginal value
of the rates from counci!"s total land available for rateable purposes. This reaches
FIGURE 2
A CASE IN WHICH A LOCAL COUNCIL MAXIMISES ITS
DISCRETIONARY INCOME IF A LARGER PORTION OF ITS LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AREA IS ALLOCATED TO NATIONAL PARKS
THAN OTHERWISE BECAUSE THIS REDUCES COUNCIL'S
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a maximum for X= Xl and corresponds to the situation illustrated in Figure 1. Curve
OCF represents average rates per unit of rateable land.
Councirs total obligatory costs per unit of rateable land are represented by
curve GHJ in Figure 2. For simplicity. council's average variable costs as a function
of the rateable land area it services is assumed to be constant and is indicated by the
line LM in Figure 2. The difference between this line and curve GHJ represents
council's overhe&d costs on account of its provision of obligatory services. Given
that average variable obligatory costs are constant, corresponding marginal costs,
C'(X) are also constant and equal to average variable costs. Hence, the line LM is
also the marginal obligatory cost curve of council.
It follows in this case that the local councirs discretionary income is maximised
whenK-X I ofits area is allocated to national parks. At XI the marginal contribution
to council rates from rateable property just equals councir s marginal obligatory
servicing costs. Thus, equation (8) is satisfied. Taking into account councirs
avoided cost, it is optimal to allocate an additional area, Xl - Xio to national parks
to maximise the local council's discretionary income, compared to the situation in
which the councirs obligatory costs are ignored.
FIGURE 3
A CASE IN WHICH REDUCTION OF COUNCIL'S COSTS INCREASES
THE DISCRETIONARY INCOME OF A LOCAL COUNCIL FROM
HAVING PART OF ITS LOCAL AREA IN NATURAL PARKS, AND A
CASE WHERE IT DOES NOT
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Secondly, the avoidance of obligatory costs by a council, as a result of local land
being allocated to national parks, may convert what would be, in the absence of
consideration of such costs, acorner-point solution into an interior one. In other words,
the situation is altered from one in which no allocation to national parks is optimal from
the point of view of local council to one in which some such allocation is optimal.
This is illustrated in Figure 3, in which the curve ABCD represents the marginal
contribution to the receipts of local council from land rates of retaining rateable
property. In the absence of obligatory council costs, council maximises its
discretionary income by having none of its local area in national parks. However,
if the local council has marginal obligatory servicing costs indicated by line LM,
its discretionary income will rise if K - X4 of its local area is allocated to national
parks. But if the local council's obligatory service costs are as low as those indicated
by line L'M', the level of the discretionary income of the local council is reduced
if any of its local government area is allocated to national parks or similar areas.
Lastly, Figure 4 illustrates anothercase where a local counci Iloses discretionary
income if any of its local area is allocated to national parks. In this case, curve OFG
represents council rates on average per unit of rateable land and curve AHJ is the
corresponding marginal curve. If LM represents marginal obligatory costs of
council for servicing its rateable land, any allocation ofits local land area to national
FIGURE 4
A CASE IN WHICH LOCAL COUNCIL HAS REDUCED
DISCRETIONARY INCOME IF LAND IS ALLOCATED TO
NATIONAL PARKS
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parks will reduce the level of total discretionary income available to the local
council. A corner-point solution exists in which the council maximises its
discretionary income by having all land ofits area rateable, and none ofit in national
parks.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Whether the local government has an economic advantage from the presence of
national parks in its local area depends on the specific circumstances. When council
expenses do not fall proportionately wilh the loss in its income from land rales due
10 land being locked up in national parks, it need not be financially disadvantaged
by the presence of national parks in its area. Consider, for example, the situation
illustrated in Figure 2. Compared with a situation where no national parks exist in
a local area, the relevant local government can gain revenue in this case if some of
its area, K - X" is allocated to national parks. But its costs in proportion to its
rateable land rises in this case because of overhead costs. Other favourable cases
are possible even if council's variable costs per unit of rateable area rise somewhat
due to establishment of national parks.
Naturally, the above analysis requires some simplifying assumptions. For
example, land is assumed to be homogeneous in nature, or if heterogeneous, mixed
in its qualities in fixed proportions. Such an assumption can be relaxed in principle,
but this is likely to make the problem analytically difficult.
Furthermore, the question arises about how to differentiate between obligatory
council servicing and discretionary expenditure by council. The division is indistinct
at the margin, and in part determined by social perceptions, but nevertheless is a
useful distinction. It parallels a similar concept for managerial behaviour introduced
by Williamson (1964). Williamson (1964) develops a utility maximisation model
for managers of companies in which he assumes that managers have preference for
managerial slack as well as greater funds for discretionary investment spending.
Also, the assumption that local governments aim to maximise discretionary income
may be subject to criticism. Nevertheless, it has some parallels with Niskanen' s
(1981) view that bureaucracies try to maximise the size oftheir budget. If this were
literally true for local governments. they would try to maximise their rateable
property values - the case considered in the second section of this note. But there
is also no a priori reason to rule out the modified hypothesis that local government
bodies may wish to maximise their discretionary income. Ifthis is the case, they will
be somewhat more favourably disposed towards the presence of national parks or
similar natural areas in their local area.
While this simplified analysis does help in clarifying many of the important
local public finance issues involved in reservation of local areas for national parks,
it is also clear that this type of analysis is in its infancy and that little or no in-depth
empirical work has carried out on the type of relationship which underlie it.
An additional contentious issue is whether or not national parks increase
incomes in their local area or reduce them. Clearly, once ag'ain the situation varies
with circumstances. However, the loss of local income as the result of the
establishment of national parks can be considerable, particularly in developing
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countries, as a study of Khao Yai National Park in Thailand indicates (Kaosa-ard,
1995). On the other hand, positive (sometimes substantial) local income benefits
can emerge from increased tourism, as seems to be the case for Noosa National Park
(Pearson el al., 2000) and as observed elsewhere in Australia, for example in
Budderoo National Park in Southern NSW (Gillespie, 1997). Nevertheless, the
situation has to be carefully assessed to ensure that an local social costs and benefits
are taken into account in the overall social evaluation of the provision of protected
areas.
Furthermore, it might be emphasised that this analysis can be applied to local
government land areas assigned to uses apart from their allocation to national parks
if the areas so allocated are not subject to local rates. l Examples include unassigned
crown land, municipal parks. some state forest areas, and reserved areas for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (ATSl). The actual impacts on property
values in such cases can be complicatedjust as they are in the case ofthe assignment
ofareas for national parks; much more complicated than is apparent from the above
analysis. The above analysis concentrates on general features and thus ignores
factors such as the spatial distribution of the assignment of non-rateable land in
local government areas.
If land assigned to a national park or protected area is not previously rateable
land (as for instance is the case for crown land, and much state-held land), and if
the assignment results in higher property values on average in the local government
area surrounding the protected area, total rateable property values will rise, even
though no rates are payable on the protected area. In addition, if/he presence of/he
park or protected area imposes little extra cost on the relevant local council,
council's net revenue can be expected to rise as a result of establishment of the
protected area. However, when rateable land must be forgone to establish a national
park or protected area. the net income available to the relevant council can be (but
need not be) reduced by the establishment of the protected area, as the above
analysis demonstrates. Furthennore, where the assignment of land for a national
park or protected area pre-empts its future assignment as freehold land, a local
council may lose potential future income because the extent of its future rateable
land is less than otherwise would be the case. The above analysis may also be used
to exantine this possibility. In many cases in Queensland, it is this possibility of
missing out on a future opportunities to increase their rateable tax-base which is of
greatest concern to local councils.
This statement holds for reserved areas for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders
(ATSI). ATSI areas are not subject to local government land rates.
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